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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN EU:  
HOW MUCH "FREE MARKET", HOW MUCH “WELFARE STATE”? 
 





Recent evolutions in Europe raise questions on the viability of the actual 
economic and social model that defines the European construction project. In this 
paper, using the logics of economic theory, we will try to explain the viability of 
institutional European model that stick between free market mechanisms and 
protectionism. The main challenge for the EU is about the possibility to bring 
together the institutional convergence and the wellbeing for all Europeans. This is 
the result of the view, still dominant, of European politics elite, according to 
which institutional harmonization is the solution of a more dynamic and prosper 
Europe. But, economic realities convince us that a harmonized, standardized 




The challenge for future in EU consists in the reaction and evolution of the 
European institutional arrangement post-integration faced with the necessity to 
reform the services sector in accordance with the free market criterion. If 
„development through integration” seems to be harmonization through 
institutional transplant, how could then be the European model one sufficiently 
wide open to market which create the prosperity so long waited for by new 
member countries? The second part of the paper will bring into discussion a 
number of issues related to the actual success and/or the failure of completing the 
internal market in the services sector. We will discuss the role of competition 
policy in liberalizing the market of services using examples of the EC decisions 
and ECJ jurisprudence. Then we will recollect the success and the benefits of 
liberalizing network industries in Europe. Finally, we touch upon the sensitive 
issue of services of general interest. Based on these findings we note that there is 
still a long and painful way to go towards the overprized completed single market, 
at least in the services sector. 
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Harmonized Europe or European Harmony? 
 
Latest news presented great union demonstrations that almost paralyzed 
symbol towns of EU. Worried and astonished, we assisted to the terrifying show 
offered to the entire world. “Bolkenstein Directive”, against which were hundreds 
of thousands of European people, seemed to become a horror movie title that 
threatened to dethrone social privileges of the welfare state. In France, politics 
proposed in order to liberalize the labor market turned Paris in a siege capital, 
through which unions almost colonized the state. This is the image of an 
unprecedented institutional crisis that characterizes the present social 
arrangements of UE.  
There is no doubt that we speak about an amazing state of affairs, contrary 
to “social cohesion and solidarity” challenges that begin and end almost all EU 
programmatic documents. 
European integration is built on a system of common policies negotiated and 
adopted by European governments. This integration process is not the result of the 
political constraints abolition, it does not mean free market and competition 
mechanisms, despite all efforts towards these. We can speak about a political-
bureaucratic option towards what should be the economic and society European 
model. And this political normative derived into an institutional arrangement 
exported, with the highest fidelity possible, to member countries and to those that 
applied for membership. 
We are all aware of the confusion that the philosophy of EU political elite 
makes between “harmonization” and “harmony”. In fact, harmonization is another 
way of speaking about ”unification”, meaning accepting a unique rule, in fact 
“standardization” that European institutional arrangement propose to almost all 
social life sectors. 
Harmonization architects seem to ignore what is most important 
precondition for the economic prosperity, meaning diversity, competition between 
different institutional arrangements and, in globalization terms, even between 
different fiscal systems. Competition is the only one that can improve the 
situation, meaning reducing tax burdens and improving public services. 
Within economic sectors, same as in music, harmony does not derive from 
unanimity agreement, but from diversity agreement. This could be the future of 
fiscal Europe: European contributors capitalize the inter–jurisdictional 
differences, and those will facilitate tax competition. For the very moment, 
hundreds of young French go abroad trying to escape from the French tax system 
rapaciousness. Which could be the harmonization scope? To stop the free 
movement of production factors by constraining the other European countries to 
“harmonize” (it could be also read “increase”) their tax system to rough 
requirements of welfare state. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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Free market vs. protectionism 
 
The entire EU institutional arrangement - with American pedigree at its 
origins - is fundamentally the result of the European political system. Despite 
many economic arguments being quoted in favour of European integration, the 
defining source of the European project is, par excellence, primary a political one. 
Initially, the energies of the European integration were animated by the necessity 
to build a (political) power to counterbalance the American „imperialism” and the 
un-precedent taking aim of East Asia. In time, the economic dimension gained 
(an) increasing importance.  
But who are the creators of this political project and what were they aiming 
at? The founding fathers of the „United States of Europe”, starting with Jean 
Monnet, were convinced that the „high” European authorities would have the 
capacity to plan the economic development overriding the economic principles of 
the market. We talk here about the model of an economy built via and 
surrounding the state policies and budgets? As shown in Institutions and 
Prosperity. From Ethics to Efficiency (Marinescu, 2004), the allocation of public 
resources does not impede the exigencies of economic calculus and of markets, 
but rather political rationales. In fact, the political allocation of resources bears the 
stamp of any governmental budget. European budgets are built on an immense 
scheme of subsidies, aids, structural funds and financial external assistance. All 
this explains the redistribution of resources in the European space via 
governmental budgets, the European budget and the common policies.    
The candidate countries, being in the position of net-receivers, consider this 
a very positive process, at least at this stage. Since the Marshall Plan, it became 
clear that the dramatic expansion of „foreign aid” programmes is the result of a 
political option and not necessary of an efficiency criterion. Hence, the 
impossibility to assess whether the politically „exported”  resources will serve a 
real economic need or will only contribute to feeding corruption and the 
“ossification” of the state elites.  Billions of dollars external aids offered 
generously to the African countries by international financial institutions had a 
modest efficiency or proved to be painfully failure in reducing poverty (India, 
some countries from Latin America or Africa). Numerous studies have shown that 
external financial assistance neither creates, nor is it correlated with the essential 
sources of prosperity. If liberty is the determining source of prosperity, one could 
notice that a reduction of economic freedom is often – paradoxically - the result of 
foreign aid increasing
1. Setting external fund at the foundation of a country’s 
                                           
1 See the works of Lal (2002), Bauer (1993), Johnson (2003), Bandow and Vasquez (2001). 
For exemple, Bandow and Vasquez demonstrate the obvious inefficiency of foreign aid in India’s 
case: starting with „first five year plan”, since 1951 till 1990, India received the highest financial Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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economic success is a dismal illusion. This approach neglects the role of liberal 
policies (some of them even anti-European) in creating prosperity. Ireland is a 
very good illustration of the case when the reduction of public expenditure 
exceeded the inflow of European funds.  
In its essence, the transition to market economy resides in the generalization 
of the private property as a fundamental institution and its logic corollaries: 
economic freedom, markets and economic calculus. For all candidate countries, 
excepting probably Estonia, embracing the European model was the equivalent of 
reducing the degree of state intervention in the economy and accompanied by an 
expansion of the market mechanisms. From this point of view, for the 
governments of Central and East European countries, accession represented an 
external constraint favouring the completion of reforms towards the market. For 
example, the liberalization of external trade (the adoption of a common trade 
policy), reducing the barriers to foreign investment and the free movement, the 
competition policy in general which can clarify the national business 
environments and even the almost obsessively invoked safeguard of legal stability 
and certainty.  
However, the very European model itself is insufficiently open to the 
market mechanism in order to rapidly induce in the candidate countries the long 
waited for prosperity. Moreover, embracing this model requires costs which are 
far from negligible and which can reflect in the slow down the economic 
performance. The so much wanted economic growth is the product of economic 
liberalization and market mechanisms. Prosperity is not a spontaneous result of 
gaining the EU membership, but of sound economic policies which stimulate 
capital accumulation, investment and entrepreneurship. 
CEE economies are emerging economies for which economic progress and 
spread of prosperity via the market could be more important than the protection 
by the state of consumers’ interests, job security or other aspects related to 
environmental protection. Moreover, it has been admitted that the implementation 
of European rules in labour, agriculture and environmental sectors is associated 
with huge costs, which would vitiate the potential for economic growth.  
For instance, if the European environmental regulations were immediately 
applied, they would sentence the Romanian economy to stagnation, by the 
imposition of the required high standards and prohibitive costs. It is 
                                                                                                                     
assistance of all developing countries, estimated at more than $55 billions. Almost all of these 
foreign aids were “captured” by corruption and opportunistic political programs (of nationalizing 
sectors and enterprises – on „capitalist” money!!), that lead to political elite “ossification”. Today, 
after over 50 years of centralized economy, a similarly high percentage of Indians (almost 40%) 
live at the limit of survival. Except a few cases, when the foreign aid proved fruitful - million of 
people where saved from starvation in 1950 and later on in 1960, the external financial assistance 
rendered a complete failure, encouraging corruption and socialism.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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understandable why, at present, the most stringent standards and legislations 
regarding environmental issues are to be found in the developed countries: 
improving the environmental quality is the consequence and the reflection of an 
improvement in the standard of living. Empirical studies have shown that 
environmental standards tend to rise with the GDP/capita. This means that the 
European exigencies should give priority to the fast economic growth in the 
CEEC which should be followed, rather than preceded, by an improvement in the 
environmental standards. Besides, the possibilities of reforming the present 
approach (state ownership, high standards and huge governmental spending) 
through the systematic expansion of the private property in the environmental 
sector are an illusion.  
Two years ago, the moment when ten central and eastern European nations 
were joining the EU, bringing the total number of members to 25, a great hysteria 
against “Polish plumbers” broke out. Being convinced that free movement of 
labor—a very possible pillar of the EU—would bring about a lot of poor central 
and eastern European workers desperate to earn better salaries or apply for 
welfare benefits in the richer nations, western Europeans began to demonize 
Polish plumbers. But only three countries out of the 15 old members states of the 
EU – Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden - decided to give workers from the ten 
new member countries the freedom to live and work almost without any 
restrictions. The other EU members imposed a seven-year delay on allowing those 
workers into their countries. 
Based on official data given by every country from EU, the European 
Commission has published a report which proves the 12 protectionist countries 
were dead wrong. The three countries we have spoken about - that lifted 
restrictions on labor mobility - have seen their economies grow more and create 
more jobs than the rest due to  migrant workers having essentially filled skill 
shortages in construction, restoration, and other services (many of them are 
dentists and bus drivers.) There has been no “invasion” of central and eastern 
European workers. Ireland, where the number is a bit higher, though still small, 
represents an exception as the workers are no more than 1 percent of the working-
age population in the recipient countries. Moreover, restrictions have not stopped 
workers from moving to those western European countries that chose to keep 
them out—we can speak here about the underground economy. On the contrary, 
Austria, the country that places the greatest restrictions on foreign workers, is also 
the one that got the highest number of migrant workers—all of them being “self-
employed.” And in those countries where they were welcomed, there has not been 
an increase in the number of people applying for welfare benefits—the great 
majority of workers simply want to work. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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How to react to such a situation? On one hand, countries like Finland, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain raised the issue of lifting the restrictions and. On the 
other hand, Germany, France, and Austria announced that they would keep the 
restrictions.  What should  mention the next report regarding France, as it is a 
country registering stagnation due to protectionist legislations
1. 
Protectionism provides an open space for rent seeking. An uncompetitive 
environment is not good for consumers as they are prevented from buying the best 
products, for employees as they are prevented from working for the most efficient 
companies and, in the same time, for a better paid job and last, but not least, for 
shareholders as they are prevented from getting the highest value for their 
investments
2. 
Although labor force and services liberalization represent principles 
established from 1957 within Rome Treaty, lying at the very heart of EU, in fact 
both workers and services providers that want to operate outside the origin 
country face off a lot of barriers, social, legislative and/or bureaucratic.  
But, European Commissioners seem to be more and more convinced that 
reforming the traditional arrangement is absolutely necessary. Under these 
conditions, Achille’s heel of ongoing reforms in EU seems to be services market. 
“Bolkenstein Directive” – after the name of its forerunner, the former European 
Commissioner for Internal Market, Frederick Bolkenstein - is his last major 
legislative proposal. It is designed to make the market for services within the EU 
as free as the market for goods. Its particular sting is a country-of-origin clause 
which would allow a Polish, Baltic or Hungarian person, say an architect or a 
market research agent, to sell a service in Germany or France while only paying 
the (low) social insurance premiums and taxes due in his home country. This is 
taken in Western Europe as a quite flagrant licence to practice "social dumping", 
the undercutting of decades of socialist achievements, and is political dynamite. 
President Chirac of France has promptly "vetoed" the directive and was joined, 
                                           
1 French President Jacques Chirac denied the idea that his country has recently become 
more protectionist, sustaining that France is as protectionist as it has always been. The ten 
industries about which President Chirac and  Prime Minister Dominique De Villepin, classified 
“strategic industries” are the followings: private security, arms manufacture, biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical labs that produce antidotes, nuclear power, cryptology, computer security, defense 
contracting, the interception of communications, and casinos. All these deserve protection against 
foreign takeovers. Yet the problem is not just that the French will protect their national champions 
at the expense of consumers—or rather taxpayers, since part of their electricity and gas bill is paid 
by general fiscal revenue. The real problem is that because France is a strong player in the 
European arena, it’s setting a precedent that is already being followed by many others. 
2 The sector where protectionism is extremely dangerous is the energy one. All companies 
have to be big and profitable and not dependent on public money or state protection. The unique 
market liberalization is the necessary condition for the Old Continent to begin to grow again. The 
choice that European leaders are called to make is very important for our common future as a 
wealthy region. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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though in less peremptory style, by German Chancellor Schroeder. Brussels says 
the directive has been issued under existing powers, cannot be "vetoed" and will 
stand. The French government of course will do as it pleases. It will not be the 
first time that it refuses to apply a directive or honor a treaty; its contempt for the 
deficit limit it signed up to in the Maastricht stability pact is eloquent proof that 
the EU cannot force a major member country to do what it really hates doing. 
 
Institutional transplant of European centralism  
 
There are two ways in which the national governments could react to the 
generalization and the intensification of competition: giving up to the market 
forces or forming a cartel. The first means the consolidation of freedom and a 
greater prosperity, the second one erodes freedom, determines the preservation of 
the status quo and only redistributes wealth.  
The first way reflects the generalization of the institutional competition, 
which represents the spontaneous adjustment of the national institutional 
arrangements with the aim of improving competitiveness and economic 
performance. IN the context of globalization – intensification of cross-border 
trade and the increased mobility of factors of production – economic systems are 
prone to certain adjustments and even to institutional changes of high magnitude. 
Under the new circumstances, the institutional competition – the competition 
between rules – is the natural consequence    of technological and organizational 
innovations. These have induced the increase in the mobility of goods and people 
at international level, the unprecedented development of communications through 
the reduction of transaction costs. Thus, the opportunities offered by the external 
market are greater and their fructification becomes more advantageous.  
The European model of institutional building and political governance 
corresponds to the second path. This derives from the European political elite 
belief that the politically and economically uniformed, harmonized United Europe 
will better resist the “disruptive” forces of globalization. In this view, the acquis 
would represent an instrument of harmonization through institutional transplant 
and the taking over the legislation corpus (acquis communitaire). 
The Brussels bureaucracy, also called Eurocracy, has developed specific 
forms of hierarchical coordination and administrative harmonization (read 
standardization) in almost every domain of public policy. The transposition of the 
97.000 pages of European legislation means importing institutions, administrative 
structures, legal practices and economic policies. The acquis illustrates probably 
the best way the legislation can be turned into a governing (political) instrument, 
thus creating a radical discrepancy between Legislation (governing regulation) 
and Law (applying the rule of law through the distinction between good and evil). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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Moreover, the project of the European Constitution, the longest and most 
politicized constitution of all times - 270 pages and 70.000 words, in comparison 
with the only 17 pages and 4.500 words that the USA Constitution counts) is a 
clear example of European centralism at economic, institutional and political 
level.  
With regard to the constitutional arrangements, one needs to mention that 
the most important difference between the American Constitution and the 
Constitutional project of the European Union resides in their view on “rights”. 
The „Bill of Rights” of the US Constitution consists in a list of individual rights 
against the state and its constraining powers, the „Charter of Fundamental Rights” 
of the European project consists in a long list of rights to the state monopolized 
services, like the right to education and health, the right to security, social 
assistance, right to work etc. The US Constitution is largely build on the 
philosophy of “the right to …” (ownership) because, lastly, the philosophy of the 
natural right of John Locke demonstrates the human rights cannot be conceived 
other than as ownership rights. In turn, the European constitutional project talks 
about “the right of…”, a concept that implies the very undermining of the true 
human rights, by the expansion of political power and the authority of the state 
over the life of the individual. By the sacrifice of these fundamental principles of 
law, the authors of the constitutional treaty project have overloaded the vessel of 
social rights with nothing else but privileges that dilute the concepts of contract 
and individual responsibility, favouring set up of a union like, collectivist regime.  
The accession process, as it was conceived, was based on the creation and 
consolidation of an executive specialized branch at national level, which favours 
the executive component of government. This derives from the fact that the 
negotiating process and the adoption of European norms is, in reality, an 
administrative exercise which has the nature of consolidating even more the 
“statist model” in Europe through the perpetuation of the welfare (redistributive) 
state and the social market economy model - a model whose economic 
performances are more and more modest. The fact that the whole process of EU 
enlargement has developed in a purely elitist, technocratic way has eroded the 
public support and the trust in the integration process. This could explain why, in 
what regards the enlargement issue, the public opinion in many European 
countries is less enthusiastic than in the Brussels officials’ declarations.  
From an economic perspective, it is not clear why should EU be an 
centralized institutional and political arrangement. The free market and 
competition are capable of boosting Europeans prosperity without necessarily 
regulating the size and shape of fruits and vegetables, as it happens with the 
European legislation. Almost all economic and social policies and subject to 
“harmonization” at a pan-European level while enlargement based on a strictly 
conditionality system becomes a powerful instrument of reducing diversity.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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At fiscal level, harmonization could lead to the alignment of taxes “higher” 
at the level of most burdensome fiscal regimes. It is alarming that European 
officials tackle the competition issue only half the way: competition is good, but 
not between governments (at fiscal level). It seems ironic that many European 
officials have shown concerns for the fact that some countries use fiscal dumping 
as more and more business turn towards more friendly fiscal jurisdictions. 
Moreover, both at EU and OECD level, there are concrete proposals for fiscal 
harmonization in order to prevent the damages of fiscal competition!! These 
measures are meant to prevent the national governments to resort to the fiscal 
competition “gun” as the main means of rending their business environment more 
appealing; this is similar with prohibiting the entrepreneurs to use all the tools and 
instruments they know for obtaining the best quality product in the least costly 
way. In that case, the constitutional rights of American and Swiss citizens to 
legislative proposals of fiscal reductions should be forbidden, since this would 
lead to the reduction of revenues from taxation to the German of the French 
government?! And, to finally conclude on the issue of fiscal competition, we 
should quote Pascal Salin who said that prosperity needs not to abolish the “fiscal 
paradises”, but to abolish the „fiscal hell”... 
Theoretically, fiscal competition if the natural consequence of the mobility 
of taxation base between the states. As a non-cooperative game between 
governments, the fiscal competition generates the incentive to reduce the fiscal 
pressure for the taxation bases with a higher mobility and the increase of the 
burden for the factor of production and activities less mobile. As globalization 
diminishes the possibilities for monopolies to resist in different markets, so it acts 
towards the limitation of the monopoly of governmental power. Consequently, 
governments that cannot resist fiscal competition could exhibit the tendency to 
operate at a higher level of constraint of the political monopoly, in a fiscal cartel 
very likely to be built at European level.  
At present, the ample technological and institutional changes facilitate the 
international migration and the intensification of fiscal policy in the labour 
markets, a factor whose mobility has increased significantly: the high tech sector 
specific skills, artists, sportsmen, all place their activities taking into account the 
friendliest fiscal jurisdiction. For instance, the fiscal authority in France reports 
that each year, thousands of tax-payers leave the country for fiscal reasons; a large 
number of French entrepreneurs place their operations in UK; the strong relief of 
fiscal pressure in Ireland has reversed the traditional trend of migration.  
At sector policy level, guided by its aim to “organize” (read make uniform) 
whole sectors of economic activity, the European Commission has adopted the 
strategy of „common policies”, based on the proliferation of regulations, 
administrative controls and political subsidies. What are the results? The ACP - an Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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expression of the view that private agriculture is impossible – has deprived 
consumers, contributors and even farmers. The Brussels fixed prices did not 
prevent the rural exodus; they have put pressure on households’ income, while the 
protectionist policy diminishes the benefits from agricultural cheaper imports. 
Moreover, as a result of accession, the farmers in the new Member States will 
have to reduce their output in conformity with the already negotiated and arbitrary 
established quotas together with the European decision making bodies, based on 
un-loyal competition grounds, despite the fact that old Member States export more 
to Easter Europe than they import. But how do the production quotas – a concept 
reminiscent from the old soviet system - shake hands with the idea of a true, 
compete internal market?  
 
The welfare state or the redistribution that deprives  
 
When the economic history of Europe from the last third of 20th century 
will be written, we will understand the whole series of battles that national 
governments have launched against the economic reality, with the mere illusion 
that victory can be granted by the embodiment of a simple majority. In this period, 
Europe was dominated by the institutional arrangement of the welfare state, 
whose practices were promising education, healthcare, security, prosperity, jobs, 
in a word happiness for everyone. For the achievement of this goal, national 
governments understood to increase governmental spending to over 50% of their 
GDP
1. 
Beyond the increase in public spending, the welfare state machinery was 
fortified by numerous protectionist laws, ranging from an extremely elaborated 
system of “working rights” to a huge administrative mechanism in the social 
insurance and social care. The almost full subordination of the economic to the 
political was justified, on a large scale, by two reasons. The first one, packaged in 
cheap electoral pills like „The man counts more than the market” or „In 
democracy, it is the votes that decide, not the dollars”, is based on the fallacy that 
man, on one side and dollars, on the other side, have conflicting interests. The 
second reason, one that amplified the invasion of economy by a multitude of 
“welfare” policies consists in the unhappy belief that the redistribution of income 
by the government through taxation and policies is an act of “social justice” and a 
moral duty.  
The institutional arrangement initially named “welfare state” was later on 
recalled in numerous programmatic declarations of EU as the “European model. 
This very skilful linguistic manoeuvre is meant to underline the clear antagonism 
                                           
1 In 2005 the governmental spending reached 53% of GDP in France. That was 
accompanies by solemn promises from the political power to effectively control public spending 
within the next years, so that they would decrease to (sic!) 51% by 2010.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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of the „European model” in contrast with the „Anglo-Saxon” or, even further, 
with its political rival, the „American model”. In this sense, the supporters of the 
institutional construction of the EU try to accredit the idea that the performance of 
this „European model” will be the more obvious, the more the good Europeans 
will disagree with the cultural model of Anglo-Saxon origin.  
Obviously, the claim that, at present, this „European model” would be 
representative for all Europeans is biased. Essentially, the nature of the „model” is 
French-German. Its essence is derived from the French socialism of military 
Gaullist inspiration, from the German social-democracy and the doctrine of the 
unions
1. Thus, the European model gets attached, as it is the case for any „rational 
planned” society, to its own system of cultural values, meant to clearly illustrate 
the dislike of the Anglo – Saxon civilization, still liberal, but more and more to a 
lesser extent.  
The fundamental trait of the “European model”, taken over ad-literram from 
the arrangement of the „welfare state”, consists in the redistribution of welfare in 
the society. Nowadays, the political redistribution of property is considered, even 
amongst economists, a “natural” prerogative of the state. But the 
institutionalization of the redistributive practices of the welfare state produces, 
during time, as it has been proved, two types of consequences that inhibit 
economic prosperity
2. 
 a) At economic level, the incentives for work, initiative and entrepreneurial 
activity are negatively affected; a decrease in the rate of capital formation, the 
disincentive of the investments with depressive effects on the economic activity.  
b) At socio-cultural level, changes occur in the social structure regarding the 
types of personality and character of humans. Social assistance is the one that 
creates a “mentality of assisted” and favours the collectivist and equalizing 
cultural values.  
Beyond the precarious realism of the policies of the European welfare state, 
the main goal of the “model” consists in developing a vast scheme of social 
security, starting with the full monopoly of state in the education sector, goes 
further with the legal protection of labour places, the best paid holidays, the 
                                           
1 The European Union tradition is well known. The Americans had spoiled theirs by the 
capitalist „spirit” that animated the initial development of their economy. If socialism was aiming 
at collective state property on capital, the union-ship (as a doctrine and a tactic) had as a 
fundamental goal the abolition of the separation of workers from the means of production and 
consequently the annihilation of the entrepreneurial spirit (see Ludwig von Mises, 1966, chapter 
XXXIII). 
2 See Marinescu (2004) Ch. 5 on  Political institutions: the power of non-owners, p. 181-
236. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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lowest duration of labour-time that ever existed and ends up with the social 
insurances for the unemployed and the state pensions.  
But which are the economic costs of this social „generosity”? First, we need 
to understand this public “generosity” is built on higher taxes that have always 
defined the welfare state institutional arrangement. The redistribution mechanisms 
and the burdensome taxation are the very sources of the economic problems that 
Europe faces at this moment. First, we talk about a very pale economic growth 
experienced by some of the hard-core members of the Union. Economic growth 
rates of 1-2% have become almost a rule, thus being official figures of the 
economic counter-performance in the EU. Happily, the economic growth deficit 
in the EU raises serious constraints for the European elite in continuing to rolling 
systematically the social (read “political”) leverages of “welfare”. Secondly, it is 
the serious frictions in the way of the realization of “social harmony” whose 
source resides, ultimately, in the administrative defection of the labour market 
mechanism. During the thirty years since the “social model” became a political 
must, unemployment exploded from an average of 4% to over 10% in France and 
to approx. 12% in Germany. And from the side-slip of the labour market (if we 
allow ourselves to call it labour market) to the undermining of the fundamentals 
of civilizations, of “social cohesion” (a concept so dear to the planners of the EU) 
are only a few very small steps.  
The morale is that social policies meant at ensuring social cohesion end up 
by off-setting economic growth and implicitly, the creation of jobs, which also 
explains the dramatic tensions in the labour market in countries like France and 
Germany. Moreover, the partisans of the “European social model” proved the 
misunderstanding of a simple economic logic when they claim that unemployment 
is high in Europe because the model is not “social” enough…or “European”, 
which holds the danger of giving birth to an even more stringent need of European 
“harmonization. In reality, unemployment is the consequence of a labour market 
stiffens by its own over-regulations by the job protectionism. This is contrary 
even to the principle of “freedom of contracts” by a fiscal burden that ruins the 
incentives of entrepreneurship, hence the scarcity of the newly created jobs. In an 
economy dominated by the public sector, the thirty years time of economic 
socialist policies have spoiled the incentives of the entrepreneurship and turned 
the “working class” to an amorphous mass continuously nourished with 
preferential legislation
1. 
                                           
1 In „Winning Policy Battles, but Losing the War Against Economic Realities”, Anthony de 
Jasay (2006) shows how workers benefit from the „social model” compared with the ones exposed 
to the market’s whims. When some years ago Toyota set up a division of its automobile assembly-
lines in the industrial region from Northern France, the president of the company expressed his 
satisfaction for this choice by contrast to UK because „English workers can allow themselves to be 
cheeky while French cannot”. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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An U-turn in Community law 
  
Although for some three decades the Community adhered to what one 
would call the protectionism of the public utilities at national level, making them 
practically carved out of the internal market, the same Community embraces quite 
an opposite view nowadays. Since the late 1980s, the EU made great strides in the 
liberalization of network markets. One should notice that the core article on which 
both views are based has never been changed.  
Art. 82, former Art. 86 of the EC Treaty is a compromise article balancing 
the Community interest - integration, as expressed in basic treaty provisions – and 
the member states’ interest – the reasons of granting an exclusive right. The hard-
core provisions of the internal market include free movement, free establishment 
and effective competition. With respect to undertakings, art. 82 (former86) states 
that “Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure 
contrary to the rules in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in art 
12 (discrimination in what regards nationality) and articles 81 to 89 (rules of 
competition: antitrust and state aid control). This provision taken literally is (or 
should function) as a liberalization clause. However, one could get exactly the 
opposite conclusion from the 2
nd paragraph where the same art 82 states that if 
undertakings have been entrusted with “services of general interest”, the 
subjection to treaty rules is conditional. It is particularly the case of network 
industries. The derogation is meant to protect the public-service function, as the 
rules  ‘apply insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular task assigned to them’. The old 
approach that ruled for three decades was to take for granted the fact that 
traditional public utilities needed exclusive rights for the performance ‘of the 
particular task assigned to them’. Challenging the very existence of such legal 
monopolies or their exercise of exclusive rights occurred very rarely and did not 
have an impact on the markets.  
Starting with the early ’90, a different approach was embraced. The first 
change was marked by the Corbeau case, when the necessity test
1 was introduced 
in order to trace the boundaries of the Belgian postal monopoly. This test opened 
the pathway towards more fundamental queries, such as the necessity of the 
exclusive rights
2 for the universal service itself, with or without uniformity of 
tariffs.  
                                           
1 Basically, the test consists in answering the question on what public service obligations 
would the utility be unable to meet without being a legal monopoly? 
2 The issues is whether or not there exist other less restrictive, pro-competitive solutions to 
the same problem that would not fragment the internal market by reducing competition.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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A second step forward was done by the need for justification of the 
exclusive right on he member states, what is called in legal terms “the burden of 
proof”. This is another radical change of approach, opposite from the past when 
the existence of the natural monopoly was legal if motivated by a public service. 
In this respect, the new interpretation of law forced national policy makers into a 
functional reconsideration about the rationale of utilities regulation.  
It is true that solely the interpretation of the same old legal bases, in our case 
a few Treaty articles cannot by itself be considered responsible for this change of 
approach. There are other factors that play a role: actual observations of the 
network markets, trendsetting at national level, even the reasoned proposals from 
the Commission (many times the forerunner in the liberalization process). But, 
again, although ruling more in favor of the new approach
1, the ECJ tends to allow 
considerable margins of discretion to member states (Blum, 2000). 
A similar situation arises via regulation and fragmentation of internal 
market by self-regulation. In this case, it is not the state-monopoly, but the very 
national suppliers of services that would impose regulations hindering 
competition. In a decision dating April 2004, the Commission imposed fines on 
the Belgian Architects Association (BAA) who had infringed Art 81 of the EC 
Treaty by adopting and making available a minimum fees scale as "guideline" for 
its members. The fee scale contained in the so called Ethical Standard 2 had a 
prescriptive character instead of being just a descriptive codification as claimed by 
the Association. The BAA had hindered price competition within this liberal 
profession for a time span of over 35 years.  
One should see this very special case of art 81 application within the general 
framework of the Commission policy towards liberal professions and in the light 
of previous decisions
2 where no fines or only symbolic fine were imposed. In its 
Report on Competition in Professional Services (February 2004), the Commission 
stressed the need to encourage the national regulatory authorities and 
professional bodies to revise and amend their restrictive rules.  
The BAA case is also to be seen in the wider context of the intentions of 
former Commissioners Monti and Bolkestein to liberalize liberal professions, a 
sector which is still highly regulated and the decision refers to a relatively new 
field of application of competition rules. This very decision has very often been 
presented by the lobbyists as an example of Commission ‚interfering with the 
right of and principles of subsidiarity’, which happens very often when people 
                                           
1 In market sectors, probably the greatest impact of the Commission in giving the sign 
towards more ‘free’ movement of services and it  the rulings of ECJ can be seen on telecoms and 
broadcasting. In postal services, the Corbeau has limited the scope of monopolies on express mail 
services.  
2 For example 1993 CNSD - Italian customs agents - and 1996 Fenex - Dutch forwarding 
agents. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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only have superficial knowledge of the filed and when enough rhetoric can weight 
into the favour of the louder voice.  
Liberalisation and regulatory reform 
Despite the efforts of Commission, a forerunner of liberalization, backed up 
or encouraged by ECJ decisions, we need to remind that the nature of  network 
liberalization is being recent, gradual, uneven and complex (Pelkmans, 2002). 
One should also keep in mind the very truth that competition policy is weak when 
the host country regime is still the rule in EU, which is the case, at present, in the 
services sector. Therefore a different approach was needed, and that was exactly 
the idea of the regulatory reform, coming as a proposal in the Bolkestein directive.  
Most of the recent progress in the area of services was based on agreed 
liberalization and approximation, sometimes called harmonization. The use of 
directives adopted by codecision by the Council and Parliament represent a 
regulatory approach towards liberalization. The Commission, making use of its 
right of initiative, took often the risk of pushing towards more liberalization, while 
encountering the opposition of the member states representatives in the Council. 
Once a proposal passed this first obstacle, another staunch opposition would come 
from the majorities in the European Parliament, with MEP being persuaded to 
vote against for ideological reasons or for fear of the protests of the so well 
organized lobbyists of the public-service unions.  
Different stages of the regulatory reform process and the level of 
competition differs significantly between sectors. While several empirical studies 
provide quantitative evidence of the sector-specific and economy-wide benefits of 
regulatory reforms in network industries (seen in terms of price level reductions, 
relevant for consumer welfare but also lowering inflation). Other research give 
evidence on the regulatory heterogeneity playing the role of an obstacle on the 
international trade for services. Increased competition (in terms of liberalization, 
privatization, unbundling, etc.) is generally associated with lower price levels, 
expanded output and labor productivity gains. 
However, regulatory reforms do have some short-term costs, mainly in the 
form of initial employment losses. The ultimate impact on sector and aggregate 
employment depends on the labor market’s ability to adjust to a changing 
economic situation. Service quality and the extent of R&D and innovation 
expenditures appear also to be positively linked to regulatory reforms. All in all, 
the empirical results in the literature tend to confirm that regulatory reforms in 
network industries enhance consumer welfare. 
From a legal point of view most of these industries are now fully or largely 
subject to competition. With regard to telecommunications, regulators are 
gradually adapting the current regulatory framework to the new business Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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environment by lessening regulation where competition has emerged and 
strengthening it where incumbents still retain a dominant position.  
Generally speaking, the experience of EU network industries demonstrates 
that an appropriate regulatory framework is indispensable in order to create de 
facto competition in these sectors, even after markets have become legally open. 
In other words, the ‘quality’ of the regulatory framework has a considerable 
impact on the extent to which regulatory reforms in network industries will result 
in price falls and other positive economic effects.  
Competition and regulation - blurred 
Although it is very difficult to isolate competition policy as a stand-alone 
policy when applied to services and especially when applied to network 
industries, one cannot notice the role played during time as well as the inevitable 
regulatory or quasi-regulatory aspects to be taken into account, that meaning that 
competition policy itself deviates from traditions in assuming quasi-regulatory 
functions. One cannot make a full analysis without touching on aspects like the 
general relation between EC competition policy and EC regulations in network 
industries, the thrust of rulings of the ECJ on network industries, the ‘essential 
facilities’ doctrine as an alterative to regulation, the problem of defining ‘relevant 
markets’ as well as the question whether the EC merger control application to 
network market regulation.  
In the telecoms package, for example, in explicit attempt is made towards 
giving competition policy a quasi-regulatory role. That means, procedures, 
deadlines and published in the Notices and Guidelines are closer to en-ante rules 
rather than ex-post policy. On one side, significant market power in the telecoms 
sector (what corresponds to the dominance concept in competition policy) is to be 
employed in an ex-ante manner, with a legal basis for regulatory obligations.  
The telecoms sector is a clear example of success for the Commission using 
its single instrument, the Directive, to show how free markets can perform better 
than monopolies, even in the case of SGI and public utilities. Moreover, the 
backing offered by the Court rulings, although surprising, nourished 
Commission`s determination to pursue the course of network liberalization in very 
sensitive area.  
Is there an internal market for services? Is there an internal market for 
network industries? At least in the telecoms and the postal services, that would not 
be the case. In the telecoms, licencing is still too discretionary
1. Although quality 
is higher and there is some convergence in prices, there is yet no removal of 
                                           
1 There is no European licence and no mutual recognition, that meaning that the so 
distortive host country control continues to be the rule. There is still hope that the mobile 
companies will create the virtual European networks. In the postal services, the situation is worse, 
with large part of the industries still reserved, including all cross-border Reims II. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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frontiers. As yet, none of the networking industries is operating in a genuine 
internal market.  
  
Not yet ready to serve? 
  
All major network industries are now subject to processes of liberalization 
and minimum regulation. Competition policy has been, at least during Monti’s 
and Bolkestein’s mandates, actively applied, trying to send clear signals towards 
need of opening national markets, also as a pillar of the more extensive process of 
liberalization in the services sectors. Although we only marginally touched upon 
the examples from two sectors – namely telecoms - where the liberalization was 
more successful than in the other areas -, and postal services, in spite of the highly 
technical issues, we can still draw some more general conclusions.  
There is a stringent need that European, especially member states come 
down from what is called the high-handed rhetoric of the Lisbon European 
Council and formulate a truly well-considered strategy for liberalization of 
services in general and of network industries as well.  
The Bolkestein directive is remarkable in a number of ways. Firstly, it aims 
at solving what we cannot exaggerate by calling an anomaly in the internal 
market, when the free movement of services, expressly mentioned in the EC 
Treaty, is working badly, randomly, be it in regulated on non-regulated areas. This 
situation is, economically speaking, a huge source of waste and foregone 
potential. The draft of the directive has one important feature – it is based on the 
“origin principle”, as opposed to the distortive “host country principle”, a rule that 
fragments the market and gives national authorities the discretion towards 
selection and restriction of foreign economic agents in their services markets. Few 
directives are based on the origin principle (TV without frontiers and the e-
commerce directive), which makes the directive so special both from a legal and 
economic point of view. The directive is meant as a framework directive, feature 
that renders it as extremely complex and technical, and in many cases inaccessible 
to the public, a characteristic that makes it also prone to misunderstandings and 
which can raise unfair criticism.  
The proposal has given rise to a tremendous emotional opposition, often 
with improper accusations and highly politicized debates at all levels. A few 
sticking points in the overly politicized debate are about two clusters of issues: on 
one hand, health and education, as long as not commercialized, do not fall under 
the head “services of general (non-economic) interest”, which will fall under the 
draft.  On the other hand, the opponents of the directive say that labor protection 
via the posted workers directive and Rome I and II convention on labor contracts, 
is insufficiently shielded from the origin principle. While the Council in its Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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common position excluded only "non-economic services of general interest", 
MEP and rapporteur Gebhardt proposed, according to her report, only 11 
technical changes. Amongst these, to exclude  all services of general interest 
(SGI), arguing that "SGI are by their very nature non-economic". 
Under the light of these, the very proposal to erase the services of general 
interest from the Directive will practically carve out the very core of the 
liberalization process from the legislative proposal, already a fragile compromise, 
rendering the document obsolete and lacking substance.  
Although the spirits were not high on this issue, one could still hope that the 
proposal still bearing the seeds of a true and complete free internal market for 
services, planted by the liberal technocrat, i.e. the Commission, would not be 
completely washed away by the conservative “voice of citizens” as it sounds in 
the European Parliament, after having partially overcome the greed of the 
conservative “voice” national protectionism.   
Unfortunately, the recent vote in the Parliament proved that Europe is still 
not ready to accept the most needed reform. The “historic compromise” although 
“still expressing the common goal of opening up the internal market for services” 
is very different from the text that would have indeed paved the way to services 
freedom in the European space. Not only is the scope of the adopted directive 
reduced, but most important, the ‘country of origin principle’ was completely 
moved away from the text and a new wording introducing far less legal certainty 
was introduces – the so called ‘freedom to provide services. The Parliament also 
introduced the reservation that member state's "requirements with regard to the 
provision of a service activity, where they are justified for reasons of public 
policy, public security, social policy, consumer protection, environmental 
protection and public health" still apply. As the  European Trade Union 
Confederation declared, on 15
th of November, “the European Parliament (EP) has 
approved at second reading the modified Services Directive, burying for once and 
for all initial Bolkestein proposal”. Thus, the convictions of the welfare state have 
won again in the battle with the free market. 
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ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN EUROPEAN UNION.                                    







This study aims to approach some interesting points of view on-looker the 
organic agriculture in Europe, a new relative area of modern agriculture, which 
is in a continuous development nowadays. 
The organic agriculture has a very important place in the agriculture in 
Europe and in entire world. In contrast to other parts of European agriculture, 
organic farming is a growth sector. Althought rapid growth has been observed in 
absolute terms, the organic farming sector is still quite small, covering only about 
four percent of total agricultural land area in the EU. Due to differences in 
support between Member States and regions, large differences in the development 
stage of the organic sector exist. 
 
The term "organic agriculture" refers to a process that uses methods 
respectful of the environment from the production stages through handling and 
processing. Organic production is not merely concerned with a product, but also 
with the whole system used to produce and deliver the product to the ultimate 
consumer. Two main sources of general principles and requirements apply to 
organic agriculture at the international level. One is the Codex Alimentarius 
Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Labelling and Marketing of 
Organically Produced Foods
. . The other is the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), a private-sector international body, with some 
750 member organizations in over 100 countries. IFOAM defines and regularly 
reviews, in consultation with its members, the Basic Standards that shape the 
"organic" term
1. According to the IFOAM 2002 Basic Standards, "organic 
agriculture is a whole system approach based upon a set of processes resulting in a 
sustainable ecosystem, safe food, good nutrition, animal welfare and social 
justice. Organic production therefore is more than a system of production that 
includes or excludes certain inputs."
2 
                                           
∗ Iuliana Mircea is Assistant Professor of International Economics at the Romanian 
American University in Bucharest. 
1 Scialabba, Hattam (2002, p. 3-5). 
2 IFOAM (2002) Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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According to the Codex Alimentarius, organic farming involves holistic 
production management systems (for crops and livestock) emphasising the use of 
management practices in preference to the use of off-farm inputs. This is 
accomplished by using, where possible, cultural, biological and mechanical 
methods in preference to synthetic materials. 
 
The Codex guidelines specify
1 that an organic production system is 
designed to: 
- “enhance biological diversity within the whole system; 
- increased soil biological activity; 
- maintain long-term soil fertility; 
- recycle wastes of plant and animal origin in order to return nutrients to the 
land, thus minimising the use of non-renewable resources; 
- rely on renewable resources in locally organised agricultural systems; 
- promote the healthy use of soil, water and air as well as minimise all forms 
of pollution there to that may result from agricultural practices; 
- handle agricultural products with emphasis on careful processing methods 
in order to maintain the organic integrity and vital qualities of the product at all 
stages; 
- become established on any existing farm through a perion of conversion, 
the appropriate length of which is determined by site-specific factors such as the 
history of the land, and type of crops and livestock to be produced”. 
Organic livestock farming is based on the principle of a close link between 
the animals and the soil. The need for a link with the soil requires animals to have 
free access to outside areas for exercise, and also implies that their feed should be 
not only organic, but preferably produced on the farm. This sector of organic 
farming is, moreover, very strictly regulated by provisions on animal welfare and 
veterinary care. 
The objectives of organic farming are identical whether we consider crop 
products or animal products: they comprise the application of production methods 
that do not damage the environment, more respectful use of the achievement of 
high-quality agricultural products. 
On 24 June 1991, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 on organic 
production of agricultural products and indications refering thereto on agricultural 
products and foodstuffs was adopted. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 
applies to non-processed crop and animal products, to processed agricultural 
products intended for human consumption, and to animal feed 
2, where labelling , 
                                           
1 CAC (1999, point 7). 
2 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 on organic 
production of agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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advertising material or commercial documents include the indication in use in 
each Member State suggesting to the purchaser that the product  was obtained in a 
accordance with the organic production method defined in the Regulation. 
Organic farming aims at sustainable farming by means of a specific farm 
production system offering an alternative to the more traditional approaches to 
agriculture. It emphasises the use of management practices avoiding off-farm 
inputs and responding to a consumer demand for naturally-produced foodstuffs 
(excluding as far as possible the use of synthetic substances). In particular, 
organic farmers are concerned about producing agricultural products while 
minimising the negative effects on the environment, preserving as far as possible 
natural resources and maintaining biological diversity on farms and their 
neighbourhood.
1 Rules have therefore been introduced to ensure the protection 
and the respect of organic farming methods. 
Farming is considered to be organic at European Union level if it complies 
with Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91. This Regulation has been amended 
on several occasions, in particular in 1999 when the Council extended its scope to 
cover organic livestock production (No 1804/99). In June 2004 , the European 
Commission adopted the “European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming “ 
whose objective is to facilitate the ongoing development of organic farming in the 
EU with 21 measures to be implemented. 
According to European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming, impact 
of organic farming is very important for the environmental protection. The main 
benefits of organic farming relate to: 
-  Pesticides – restricting the use of pesticides, as in the case of organic 
farming, improves landscape, water quality, wildlife conservation and also the 
faunal and floral diversity. 
-  Plant nutrients – organic farming usually results in lower nitrate-leaching 
rates then those achieved on average in integrated or non-organic agriculture, as 
shown by studies on autumn nitrogen residues in the soil of almost all relevant 
crops. 
-  Soil protection – management practices used by organic farmers, such as 
growing catch crops to reduce nitrate leaching, wider and more varied crop 
rotations, and mixed grazing to reduce mono-specific overgrazing, all help to 
protect the soil. 
-  Biodiversity and nature protection – organic farming contributes to the 
preservation of species and natural habitats by means of its reduced inputs, its 
                                                                                                                     
foodstuffs (OJL 198, 22.7.1991, page 1); (see also the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1991/2006 of 
21 Dec. 2006 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91); 
1 Kristiansen and Reganold, (2006, p. 3). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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high share of grassland with in holdings and its grater use of indigenous breeds  
and plant varieties.  
-  Animal walfare – organic farming may have a positive impact on animal 
walfare since the standards for organic farming include several requirements in 
this area that go further than the statutory provisions
1. 
  At EU-25 level, certified organic and in conversion area is 5.7 mio ha and 
represents 3.6% of the utilised agricultural area. At EU-15 level, certified organic 
and in-conversion area increased from 0.7 mio ha in 1993 to 5.1 mio ha in 2003.  
 There are substantial differences between the individual countries regarding 
the importance of organic farming  in EU-25. In 2003 Italy had the most 
important organic area with more than 1.0 mio ha  - about fifth of EU-25 – 
followed by Germany, Spain and United Kingdom, all three countries with about 
0.7 mio ha, and France with 0.55 mio ha. The most important organic area in the 
EU-N10 is located in the Czech Republic with 0.25 mio ha and Hungary – 0.1 
mio ha. 
In 2004, 11 Member States were above the EU-25 average of organic area 
in utilised agricultural area: Austria 9.7%, Italy 8.1%, Sweden 7.2%, Finland 
7.1%, Greece 6.8%, Denmark 6.1%, Czech Republic 6.0%, Slovenia 4.6%, 
Estonia 4.6%, the United Kingdom 4.3% and Germany 4.3%. Some of these 
Member States had already substantial share of organic area in 1993, but the 
ranking was different: Austria 4.0%, Germany 1.4%, Sweden 1.2%, Finland 0.9%, 
Denmark 0.8% and Italy 0.6%
2. 
Compared with 1999, all EU Member States increased their organic land. 
The highest increases in 2003 occurred in those Member States where the share 
was relatively low in 1999 – Greece (tripling the area), Portugal (+50%). With the 
exceptions of Austria (+10%), the Czech Republic (+15%), the United Kingdom 
and Germany, the increases werw relatively low in Member States, having a share 
in total utilised agricultural area above the EU-25 average.(Figure 1) 
 
 
                                           
1 European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming, Brussels, 10 June 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Document; 
2 Thielen (2005). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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At EU-25 level, 149 000 holdings are certified organic and in-conversion 
holdings which represent 1,4% of total agricultural holdings. For EU-N10 organic 
holdings represent a share of 0,25% in total holdings. 
In the EU-25, the average organically cultivated area per holding at 40 ha 
was significantly larger than the average area of conventional holdings at 15 ha of 
utilised agricultural area.  Compared to the average conventional holding, organic 
holdings are particularly large in two Southern Member States: Greece and 
Portugal – it might be influenced by relatively high share of olive groves. 
However, in the Member States with the most important share of organic holdings 
are United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Denmark (Figure 2). 
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      Figure 2: Utilised agricultural area per holding in EU-25 (ha). 
 
In 2004, Italy had the largest number of organic holdings (31% of EU-25 
total), followed by Austria, Spain and Germany with about 19 000-17 000 ha 
each. Over the period 1999-2004 the highest annual increase in number of 
holdings was noticed in the United Kingdom (13%), Spain (11%), Luxembourg 
(11%), Portugal (11%) and France (10%). In the same time, the number of 
holdings slightly decreased in Austria over this period. 
 
Organic agriculture in Italy 
 
In Italy the earliest pioneering experiences in organic agriculture date back 
to the nineteen-sixties, but only took off in the nineteen-seventies, involving more 
and more farmers and consumers seeking an improved quality of life and 
consumption.                                 
During the mid eighties, the first local coordination agencies established the 
"Commissione Nazionale Cos'è Biologico" (National Commission for Organic 
Agriculture). Made up of representatives of organisations and consumers' 
associations from each Italian region, the Commission established the first nation-
wide self-regulatory standards for organic farming. Once EU-Regulation 2092/91 
was implemented, the numerous small associations of organic farmers and the 
producers and consumers committees operating in every region reorganised 
themselves, joining forces through mergers and a federative network. Today, there 
are 16 officially recognised certification agencies operating in Italy. In the 
nineteen-nineties the organic sector in Italy showed one of the largest average 
annual growth rates in Europe. Since 2002 the number of farms has, however, 
decreased, because in some regions aids are not available any more. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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Most of the Italian organic farms are in the South and the Islands (32 %), 
even though with the recent decrease of the numbers of farms the share of the 
farms in the South went down. In Sicily organic farming developed at a very fast 
rate, with the number of farms increasing 2.5 times and land area almost doubling 
between 1993 and 1995. In comparison, the average rate of growth for the whole 
country was 123% and 126%, respectively, for the same period. The development 
in Sardinia is more recent, and mainly due to the application of EU Regulation 
2078/92. When pastures were admitted to qualify for aid, many sheep-grazing 
pastures were converted into organic ones (for the most part, Sardinian farmers 
are sheep breeders and producers of the well known "pecorino" cheese). However, 
on both islands the number of organic farms recently dropped.                                                  
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna have experienced pioneering organic 
movements dating back to the early 1980s. Indeed, out of the 16 certifying bodies 
five (ICEA, BioAgriCert, Codex, CCPB, QC&I) are based in Emilia-Romagna or 
Tuscany. Olive trees are grown by 60% of Tuscany’s organic farmers, while 
cereals and fruit & vegetables prevail in Emilia-Romagna. Both regional 
governments have approved special laws after EU Regulations 2092/91 and 
2078/92 to regulate and promote organic farming. Apulia in the South of Italy has 
also had a very recent growth, mainly due to policy support. Its main crops are 
durum wheat, olive oil and vegetables. 
Since most farms are stockless (with some notable exception like the 
Parmigiano area in Emilia Romagna, the sheep breeding area in Sardegna or the 
Chianina Cattle breeaders in Umbria and Tuscany), most grass is sold to nearby 
farmers or used as green manure. Cereals follow, dominating the cropping pattern 
in regions like Puglia, Sicily and Emilia Romagna. Organic rice is grown in 
Lombardia and Piemonte. Olive trees characterize most of Italian landscape and 
therefore thousands of hectares have been converted into organic management, as 
well as vineyards. Large orchards can be found mostly in Emilia Romagna, while 
small scale production is scattered everywhere. The same can be said about 
vegetable production, that is lagging a bit behind the expectations, mainly due to 
technical problems and the comparative low level of subsidies.  
Agritourism is a characteristic feature of the Italian countryside and it has 
also experienced a huge development in the last years. On the organic farms, it 
allows not only to diversify income sources, but also to sell farm products and to 
educate the guests about the benefits of organic foods, once back home. In 2000, 
the number of organic farms was up to 595 all over the country, decreasing next 
year to 471. Almost half of them can be found in the four Regions of Central Italy, 
with Tuscany in leading position.
1 
                                           
1 Santucci and Pignataro (2002). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 3 
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Italy’s Certifying and Inspection Bodies. At present, nine Certification 
bodies operate nationwide in Italy. Some of them were initially  cultural 
associations, as the Biodynamic Association (est. 1947), Suolo e Salute (est. 
1969) and AIAB – Associazione Italiana per  l’Agricoltura Biologica (est. 1988), 
linking producers, scientists, consumers etc, aiming at the development of organic 
farming. They organised  conferences and training courses, published magazines 
and lobbied for recognition of organic farming. In 1993, the Italian Minister of 
Agriculture recognized three new organizations: AMAB – Associazione 
Marchigiana per l’Agricoltura Biologica -, AgriEcoBio and BioAgriCoop. So, the 
total number of certifying bodies was up to seven. In the German speaking 
Province of Sud Tirol, at the border with Austria, the German Certification Bodies 
Biozert and IMO are authorized to operate. 
AIAB-ICEA is the largest Certification Body and probably the best known 
association at national and international level. It certifies about 24% of farms and 
29% of the organic area. Suolo e Salute is the runner up, with respectively 20% 
and 16%. The third biggest Certification Body is Bioagricoop, with 15% of farms 
and 18% of surface.  
The Biodynamic Association and AMAB still pursue stricter production 
codes than those established by the EU regulations and therefore farmers 
respecting these guidelines can even put these labels on their products. This nine 
Certification Bodies dispose of about 90 local offices, staffed with 1.000 
agronomists and other technicians, properly trained, who are responsible for 
inspecting the farms, the processing plants, the storage facilities, in order to verify 
the respect of the EU Regulations and of the Production norms established by the 
various associations, for products not covered by the EU legislation.
1    
Organic farming is one of several approaches to sustainable agriculture. It 
represents a very important agricultural system because reduces or eliminates 
water pollution and help conserve water and soil on the farm.  During the last 
three decades, the rapid increase of agricultural production in the European 
Region has been achieved mainly through the application of technologies 
involving intensive management, often at the cost of progressive deterioration of 
resources, and causing certain negative environmental impacts. The 
encouragement of farm production systems which place greater reliance on 
organic recycling, biological nitrogen fixation, and control of pests and diseases 
by husbandry methods is becoming an explicit objective of government policies 
for agriculture in many industrialized countries. The development and adoption of 
such systems are increasingly recommended as an alternative solution to present-
day agricultural and environmental problems.  
 
                                           
1 Biobank 2004. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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